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Complaints about shortages of money have been ubiquitous throughout
history. Yet many economists have tended to give this grievance short
shrift. “No complaint,” wrote Adam Smith in 1776, “is more common than
that of a scarcity of money. Money, like wine, must always be scarce with
those who have neither the wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it.”
One can even find this dismissal echoed in a recent edition of one of the
two standard texts on U.S. economic history, History of the American
Economy, written by Gary M. Walton and Hugh Rockoff, the latter of whom
is a monetary economist. In discussing the shortage of specie (that is, of
gold and silver coins) alleged by contemporaries during the colonial period
in U.S. history, Walton and Rockoff write “that most colonists preferred to
spend rather than to accumulate a stock of specie. After all, limited specie
was simply another manifestation of a capital-scarce economy. To the
colonists, it was more desirable to receive additional imports—especially
manufactures—than to maintain a growing stock of specie.”1  
Until recently, only a few economic historians seemed to have grasped that
such complaints might mask a serious problem mis-identified. One of the
first to do so was Carlo M. Cipolla, who in 1956 wrote about “The Big
Problem of the Petty Coins” in medieval and Renaissance Europe.  So long
as the price level can freely adjust up and down, there can never be a
shortage of money per se; but a denominational shortage can seem like
one. If the economy is starved for money in small denominations, it can
throttle economic exchange and the resulting gains from trade. Within the
last two decades, a number of economists have studied such
denominational dislocations in greater detail and with greater
sophistication. The two most prominent contributions, at least until now,
have been Angela Redish, Bimetallism: An Economic and Historical Analysis
(2000) and Thomas J. Sargent and François R. Velde, The Big Problem of
Small Change (2002). But George Selgin’s impressive new study, Good
Money: Birmingham Button Makers, the Royal Mint, and the Beginnings of
Modern Coinage, 1775-1821, demonstrates that their analyses require
significant modification. 2
Long after the emergence of coined metallic money, both gold and silver
continued in use. Gold’s higher value to weight ratio made it more useful for
large transactions, whereas silver was better for small transactions.
Indeed, even full-bodied silver coins would often be too minuscule in the
lowest denominations, so that coins made of copper or billon (an alloy of
copper and usually silver) remained a more convenient alternative. But of
















course the market exchange rates among these three metals could
fluctuate over time. Princes and other rulers invariably tried to fix exchange
rates through legal tender laws, official mint ratios, or other partly binding
sanctions. But doing so only brought into operation Gresham’s Law. If the
fixed exchange rate was not at equilibrium, one metal would be overvalued
and in surplus, and the other metal would be undervalued and in shortage.
More often than not, it was coins used for the smallest transactions that
were undervalued and would tend to be driven from circulation. In England,
for instance, from the Great Recoinage of 1690s on through the next
century, silver was undervalued relative to gold with the results that full-
weight silver coins flowed out of the country, the Royal Mint virtually
stopped producing silver coins, and the only silver coins remaining in
circulation were significantly underweight. 3
The works of Redish and Sargent-Velde, in fact, discovered that much
coinage depreciation was driven by this process, rather than by the efforts
of nobles and monarchs to boost their seigniorage revenue (although there
was still plenty of the latter). Whenever coins made from the officially
undervalued metal were being exported or melted down, they could be
kept in circulation either through deliberate debasement or through “calling
up” (i.e., enhancing) their face value. Sometimes depreciation would
happen automatically from normal wear and tear on the coinage or from
private clipping of coins and similar methods for shorting their metallic
content. Sargent and Velde use a complicated but contested economic
model to argue that such depreciation would be endemic even in the case
of only a single metal providing full-bodied coins for all denominations
(however physically inconvenient). Because coinage costs necessarily
varied across denominations and mints only produced those coins
purchased by the public with the requisite metal, mints would frequently
produce the wrong denominational mix, causing deviations of the market
value of certain coins from their face value. 4
The alleged solution to this recurrent problem that plagued medieval and
Renaissance commerce was what has come to be known as the standard
formula. Small-denomination coins, rather than being full-bodied, should be
tokens with a metallic value well below their face value but freely
interchangeable at a fixed exchange rate for large-denomination, full-
bodied gold coins (or under today’s monetary regimes, for fiat currency).
Although seemingly simple, the standard formula was not widely
implemented until the nineteenth century. The British government
supposedly adopted it in 1816, while the U.S. government waited until at
least 1853. Some monetary historians have suggested that it took a long
time for theorists to devise and appreciate the formula, whereas others
claim that viable token coinage had to await technological innovations that
would make it difficult for counterfeiters to flood the market with fraudulent
tokens. But nearly all have agreed that only the State could successfully
institute the standard formula. 5
What Selgin’s meticulous and wide ranging research reveals is that this last
assumption is exactly backwards for Great Britain, the first country to
implement the standard formula. The British government mainly hindered
and sabotaged the development of token coinage, which instead arose
privately. Not only had the Royal Mint’s mispricing of silver effectively
eliminated any new silver coinage by the end of the eighteenth century, but
the mint had discontinued copper coinage as well. This only encouraged
counterfeiting of the mint’s inconvertible copper coins. The counterfeit coins
at least provided some monetary services and by the mid-1750s already
accounted for at least half the copper in circulation. All this was taking place
at the outset of the Industrial Revolution, as the economy’s monetary
needs were rapidly expanding in response to the enormous shift of
workers from the farms to factories and the unprecedented growth of retail
trade. At a time when the daily laborer’s wage averaged between one or
two shillings (twelve to twenty-four pence) per day, a monetary system in
which the smallest, non-counterfeit coin readily and widely available was
the gold half guinea (equal to ten and a half shillings) hardly proved
adequate. Nor could paper money fill the gap, since the artificially privileged
Bank of England did not issue banknotes of less than five pounds (one
hundred shillings), and Parliament soon outlawed the issue of small-
denomination notes by other banks.
It was private entrepreneurs—not the Royal Mint—who finally alleviated the
shortage with “tradesmen’s tokens” or “commercial coins,” beginning with
copper “Druids” issued by the Parys Mining Company in 1787. Although a
1672 legal prohibition on private tokens was still on the books, it was
unenforced, since the private tokens made no pretence of being coins from
the mint, and indeed were noted for distinctive and exquisite designs.
Within a decade there were a score of private mints, which had struck more
copper coins than the Royal Mint had produced over the previous half
century.  Many of the new mint masters were button makers from
Birmingham. It was also private entrepreneurs—not the Royal Mint—who
curtailed counterfeiting with superior die engravings, producing high-quality
coins of uniform roundness and milled edges. As a result, private
entrepreneurs—not the Royal Mint—were the first to offer small-
denomination coins fully redeemable for money of higher denominations.
Nor did these counterfeit-proof coins require the development and
employment of the steam-driven press, as Redish and Sargent-Velde
believe. Only Matthew Boulton’s Soho mint used steam presses, meaning
that most of the eighteenth-century private tokens were manufactured
without it. While many of the less familiar tokens circulated only locally,
those issued by large-scale manufacturing and mining companies with good
name-brand capital achieved nationwide acceptance. Despite not being
legal tender, private tokens became so reliable that they generally
commanded a 100 percent premium over any Royal Mint copper coins
remaining in circulation. Indeed, Selgin makes a persuasive claim that,
without private coinage, Britain’s transition into sustained economic growth
with its reliance on wage labor would have been stifled.
Private coinage did not solve all of Britain’s denominational problems, partly
because entrepreneurs hesitated to branch out into silver coins. There was
no seventeenth-century legal precedent for the private minting of silver, as
there was for copper, and being convicted of counterfeiting the Royal Mint’s
silver coins was a hanging offense, whereas the penalties were far less
severe for counterfeiting copper coins. Then in 1797 the British government
took a step backward. It granted Matthew Bolton an exclusive contract to
provide the Royal Mint with copper pennies and twopennies, which would
be issued enjoying limited legal tender. Known as Cartwheels, these coins
were far from a success. In contrast to privately issued tokens, they were
initially produced only in higher denominations, had a copper value close to
their face value, and were not redeemable at the mint for higher
denomination coins. Eventually the naval demand for copper during Britain’s
wars with France drove up copper’s price, making the metallic value of
Cartwheels exceed their face value. Substantial quantities were melted
down despite a legal prohibition against doing so. Fortunately the older,
private tokens continued in circulation, but fears that the government
would suppress commercial coining inhibited their further production and
aggravated the small-coin shortage.
Active private minting recommenced in 1811, this time resulting in some
silver as well as copper coins. Apparently the Bank of England’s recent
issue of its own silver coins, without recourse to the Royal Mint, had
emboldened private entrepreneurs to try again. But this second round of
commercial coining was short lived. Facing pressure from the mint and its
political allies, Parliament passed in 1813 the Local Tokens Act, outlawing
private coinage. (The ban on private silver coins did not actually take effect
until two years later, and copper tokens were not suppressed for another
three years after that.) Parliament finally authorized the mint to issue its
own small-denomination token coins in 1816, and that year is usually
reported as the one in which Britain adopted the standard formula. But not
until 1836 was the full convertibility of these tokens at a fixed exchange
rate legally nailed down, making the Royal Mint’s small coins for the first
time the economic equal of those that had been privately issued a half
century earlier.6
In recounting this fascinating story, Selgin carries us far afield from the
monetary theory he thoroughly covers in his first chapter. Indeed, Good
Money is one of those very rare works that seamlessly integrates the
disciplines of economics and history, while adhering to the highest
standards of scholarship in both. It opens a window onto the business
history, the technological developments, the manufacturing techniques, and
the numismatics of the period, with a mastery and richness of detail that is
truly impressive. It engagingly captures the human side of its history,
revealing the full range of virtues and foibles exhibited by the assorted
businessmen and entrepreneurs who established and ran the private
mints, some of whom resorted to such skullduggery as lobbying for
monopoly grants from the government. The book is also graced with
sixteen pages of full-color plates beautifully displaying many of the most
important private tokens, along with other photos and prints. For readers
who want still more, Selgin provides a link to his “Ramble ‘Round Old
Birmingham,” a historical tour through the Birmingham of the private
minters. Overall, the book is a splendid achievement that should become
the standard authority on this monetary episode.
The importance of Selgin’s Good Money, however, goes well beyond
resurrecting and correcting the historical record about a single episode. The
problem of small coins turns out to have been far more widespread than
historians or economists generally acknowledge, or often it is mistaken for
a shortage of money generally and therefore grossly misunderstood. The
works of Redish and Sargent-Velde cover numerous other instances from
the medieval and Renaissance eras, many of which might repay deeper
study and possible reevaluation in the light of Selgin’s findings. Another
case I mentioned at the beginning of this review is the complaints about
monetary shortages in British colonial America, an area that would
obviously be affected by dislocations prevailing in the mother country. One
of Redish’s journal articles already explores a similar grievance in British
Canada, discovering unsurprisingly that denominational shortages were,
once again, the root cause. The same phenomenon has arisen even today
under fiat money, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where it has now become
difficult to make change. A case that particularly cries out for more detailed
investigation is that of the post-Civil War United States. Along with other
economic historians, I have elsewhere argued that the wartime financial
expedients adopted by the Union, particularly the National Banking System,
deprived the defeated South of cash in small denominations. Although
privately and usually illegally issued “shinplasters” helped to curb the
shortage in the South’s urban areas, they could not function well in the
agricultural sector, which therefore had to fall back on such essentially
barter arrangements as sharecropping and store credit repaid in crops.
Hopefully other scholars, or Selgin himself, will be inspired to direct their
future research and writing to some of these cases. 7
Still more important are the implications of Selgin’s microhistory for
monetary policy today. As Selgin himself emphasizes, “the payoff of the
commercial coinage story consists not in any particular reform it might
suggest but in the broader lesson it teaches concerning the need to
ponder government’s role in money through the same wary eyes
economists tend to cast upon other government ventures. Despite being
perfectly aware of the general drawbacks of monopoly and nationalization
and also despite their recognition of how narrow fiscal motives led
governments to usurp control of money in the first place, even otherwise
incredulous economists tend to take governments’ monetary prerogative
for granted. The outcome has been a body of monetary thought well suited
toward tinkering with existing government-controlled monetary systems
but not at all cut out for revealing the advantages, as well as the true
shortcomings, of less top-heavy alternatives” (p. 305).
Indeed, the current, international financial crisis might cause Selgin to
retract his concession that current monetary thought is "well suited toward
tinkering with existing government-controlled monetary systems.” Events
have brought the Federal Reserve System, along with general notions of
government-managed currencies and centrally planned interest rates,
under increasing criticism. Unfortunately, even as radical and insightful a
contribution as Been Steil and Manuel Hinds’s recent Money, Markets and
Sovereignty, which persuasively argues that nationalistic fiat moneys are
ultimately incompatible with economic globalization, buys into the myth that
government was needed to implement the standard formula. Despite Steil
and Hinds’s recognition that it is a “textbook fiction” (using the phrase of
monetary theorist Robert Mundell) that the State played any essential role
in money’s origin, they still write that “governments needed to impose a
single commodity anchor, such as gold coins or bills redeemable in gold,
and to make smaller denominations into limited-supply tokens, convertible
into the commodity anchor at a fixed rate guaranteed by the government.”
Yet if government intervention is truly necessary to solve the big problem of
small change, how will it ever be possible to achieve an international
money free from the machinations of the nation-State? 8
The overarching value of Selgin’s study, then, is to offer a concrete
illustration of how voluntary interaction on the market solved a complex
monetary problem and of why governments were the primary source of the
problem in the first place. We can only share his hope that “perhaps
awareness of Great Britain’s commercial coinage experience will help nudge
[monetary] thought onto less well-traveled paths” (p. 305).
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